报复性反倾销对外来反倾销起诉的抑制1阮铮摘要:世界反倾销浪潮风起云涌,本文讨论反倾销对于出口企业除了维护国内市场之外的另一种用途:抑制外来的反倾销起诉。“报复性反倾销”是在两国竞争企业均存在对对方市场倾销的前提下,企业的一种博弈策略,即一旦有一方提出反倾销起诉,此后均提出针对对手企业的反倾销起诉。本文构建一个两国垄断企业在两个分割的市场上竞争的倾销模型,在此基础上发展成为最简单的一期反倾销博弈模型,加入反倾销起诉成本和的胜诉机率两个重要概念,层层拓展。最后将一期博弈拓展到各方采用报复性战略的无限重复博弈本文指出,在“报复性反倾销”的威慑作用下,两国产业之间可能达成互不发起反倾销起诉的合作性均衡。企业对未来收益看的越重,面对相同销售量的产品价格越高—利润空间越大,或两国弱势产品的边际生产成本越高,或优势产品的边际生产成本越低,合作性均衡形成的概率就越高。意识到对外反倾销可以抑制外来的反倾销困扰,出口企业可以更加巧妙的利用反倾销来维持其在激烈的国际竞争中的地位,国家则应加以引导并提供法律上的帮助。关键词:出口企业,相互倾销,报复性反倾销,威慑,合作性均衡RetaliatoryAntidumpingtoDeterFurtherUseofAntidumpingFilingsAbstract:Overthepastdecadescountrieshaveincreasinglyturnedtoantidumping(AD)inordertoofferprotectiontoimport-competingindustries.ThispapershowsthatasecondpurposeofADforexportingfirmsistodeterfurtheruseofAD.RetaliatoryADisastrategicactiontopunishtradingpartnerwhohaveusedAD.Wefirstbuildadumpingmodelinwhichtwomonopolisticfirmscompetewitheachotherrespectivelyintwodividingmarkets,anddevelopitintoaone-periodADgamemodelbyuseofADfilingcostandADdutyprobability.WelastextendtheADmodelintoaninfinitelyrepeatedgameandcometotheconclusionthatretaliatoryADcanstrategicallydeterfurtheruseofADfilingandleadtoacooperativeoutcome.ThegovernmentshouldofferlegislationtohelpexportingfirmstoprotectforeignmarketsbystrategicuseofretaliatoryAD.KeyWords:ExportingFirms,ReciprocalDumping,RetaliatoryAD,Threat,CooperativeEquilibrium1作者感谢北京大学中国经济研究中心海闻教授在论文写作中给予的悉心指导。感谢国务院发展研究中心张小济和赵晋平两位研究员的指导和在参考材料上的无私帮助,也感谢李宏霞、郭美新等同窗的建议。作者文责自负。目录1.引言..........................................................................................................................................22.文献综述..................................................................................................................................42.1.对反倾销行为的解释...............................................................................................42.2.反倾销作为惩罚或威慑的战略性手段的有关研究...............................................43.模型设定..................................................................................................................................43.1.倾销模型..................................................................................................................53.2.反倾销起诉及裁定...................................................................................................64.一期博弈的层层拓展..............................................................................................................64.1.企业生产函数与市场需求.......................................................................................64.2.企业产量与市场价格...............................................................................................74.3.博弈一—最简单的博弈................................