本科论文摘 要委托代理问题是国内外上市公司所面临的急需解决的问题。在实践中，大多数上市公司的所有者通过薪酬等激励手段来使管理者目标与上市公司的经营目标相一致，从而减少委托代理成本，进一步增强企业经营管理效率，进而提升企业经营绩效。在我国资本市场逐步完善和发展的过程中，很多上市公司和专家学者也在积极探讨公司治理方面与企业绩效之间关系，如企业规模、高管薪酬以及持股比例与企业经营绩效的研究，为我国上市公司的高管薪酬管理以及提升股东权益等方面探索出了很多理论、制度与经验。通过研究中美两国上市公司高管薪酬并在其变化趋势方面作对比，以委托代理理论为理论基础，从薪酬结构决定因素的角度，对上市公司的高管薪酬进行研究分析，探讨各类型的高管薪酬激励形式与企业经营绩效的内在关系。在实际应用中为上市公司高管激励的实践提供理论支持，相应地推动企业经营效率的提高。关键词：高管薪酬，薪酬制度，代理成本，经营绩效本科论文AbstractThe principal-agent problem is an urgent problem for the listed companies at home and abroad. Most of the owners of listed companies use incentive means in practice such as salary to make the objectives of managers consistent with the operating objectives of listed companies, so as to reduce the cost of principal-agent, further enhance the efficiency of enterprise operation and management, and further improve the business performance of enterprises. In the process of the gradual improvement and development of China's capital market, many listed companies and experts and scholars are also actively exploring the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance, such as the research on enterprise scale, executive compensation, shareholding ratio and business performance, exploring many theories, systems and experience.Based on the principal-agent theory and from the perspective of the determinants of compensation structure, this paper studies and analyzes the executive compensation of Listed Companies in China...
