原文:Canstatetaxpoliciesbeusedtopromoteentrepreneurialactivity?AbstractDespitearecentflurryofempiricalresearchontheeffectsoftaxesonsmallbusinessactivity,state-leveltaxesfacedbyentrepreneurshavebeenoverlookedbymostoftheexistingliterature.Usinga50-statepaneloftaxpolicyinformationspanningtheyears1989through2002,ouranalysisrevealsthatstatetaxpoliciesgenerallydonotappeartohavequantitativelyimportanteffectsonentrepreneurialactivity.Whenwefindstatisticallyimportanteffects,wefindthathigherindividualincometaxrates,theexistenceofastate-levelestate,inheritanceorgifttax,andahigherweightonthesalesfactorinthestatecorporateincometaxapportionmentformulaallslightlyreduceastate’sshareofthenationalentrepreneurialstock.Resultsalsoindicatethatstateswithmoreprogressivepersonalincometaxstructuresandstatesthathavemoreaggressivecorporateincometaxesthroughtheimpositionofacombinedreportingrequirementbothtendtohaveslightlyhigherentrepreneurshiprates.Thecompositionofstatetaxportfoliosisnotfoundtobeasignificantdeterminantofstateentrepreneurship.1IntroductionTheinterplaybetweentaxpolicyandentrepreneurialactivityhasenjoyedaresurgenceintheempiricaleconomicsliterature.Mostoftherecentresearchhasfocusedonfederaltaxes,however,leavingstatetaxpoliciesrelativelyunexplored.Asstatescontinuetograpplewithdifficultissuesinbusinesstaxationanddevelopmentincentives,athoroughconsiderationoftheeffectsofstatetaxpoliciesonentrepreneurialactivitybecomesevenmoreimportant,especiallywhenconsideringthepossiblebenefitsthatcouldfollownewentrepreneurialventuresthrougheconomicgrowth,innovation,andthelike.Inthisreport,weexaminetherelationshipsbetweenstatetaxpolicyandentrepreneurshipusingalongitudinaldatabaseofdetailedinformationonstatetaxpoliciesforall50USstatesfrom1989through2002.Thisinvestigationiswarrantedforanumberofreasons.First,asaresultofthefocusonfederaltaxes,earlierresearchhasonlyconsideredasubsetofthetaxesfacingsmallbusinesses.Forexample,Clineetal.(2006)showthatthetotalstateandlocaltaxburdenforUSbusinessesincludesmuchmorethandirectbusinesstaxessuchascorporateincometaxesorstatefranchise,excise,orgrossreceiptstaxes.Businesses—especiallysmallbusinesses—alsopaysignificantamountsofpropertyandsalestaxes,alongwithagrowingmenuofmiscellaneouschargesandfees.Theexistingarrayofstatetaxstructuresprovidesavirtualcornucopiaofexogenouspolicyvariationthatcanbeusedtocleanlyidentifyentrepreneurialresponses.Asecondmotivationforourstudyistheobservationthatstategovernmentscontinuetodebateandenactthebulkofpro-entrepreneurshippolicyintheUSwithoutthebenefitofharddataontheeffectsofthosepoliciesonsmallbusinessdevelopmentandsuccess.Ononehand,highertaxesmightreduceentrepreneurialactivitybyloweringthereturns.Ontheotherhand,highertaxesincreasetherewardsfromtaxavoidanceorevasionandthusmighthavetheundesirableeffectofincreasingentrepreneurialactivity.Thesetwoimpactsmightalsooffseteachother,suchthathighertaxeshavenonoticeableimpactonentrepreneurialactivity.Theextenttowhichtaxpolicies—especiallystatetaxpolicies—actuallyinfluenceentrepreneurialactivityrequiresempiricalexploration.Iftaxesdonotaffectentrepreneurialactivity(i.e.,ifthereturnsandavoidanceeffectsareeitherbothsmallorcanceleachotherout),usingtaxpolicytoencourageinnovationorgrowththroughentrepreneurshipisnotlikelytobefruitful.Alternatively,ifanonzeroeffectcanbedetermined,theactualparameteresti...