税收、交易权和交易成本[文献翻译]VIP免费

原文：Taxes,TradableRightsandTransactionCostsWithrespecttomarket-basedpolicyapproaches,itisawidelyheldviewthatcorrectivetaxationentailssubstantial.Thisconclusiononlyholdsifset-upcostsaresingledout.Itisarguedthattheprevalenceoftransactioncostsislargelydependentonthedesignofthepolicyinstrument,respectivelythetaxbaseorthetradingregimechosen.Comparativeanalysisfurthershowsthatacap-and-tradeprogramofemissionpermitsdistributedforfree,tradedonabrokeredmarketandmonitoredupstreamisnotonlymoreeffective,butalsolikelytoentailfewertransactioncoststhanenvironmentaltaxes.Anyattempt,inturn,tosavethehugeinformation,enforcementandcompliancecostsincurredbycorrectivetaxationimpairsitsefficacybyseveringthelinkbetweentheenvironmentalexternalityandthetaxbase.Basically,thereexistfourpolicyinstrumentstocurbpollution:directregulation,environmentalliability,ecologicaltaxesandtradableemissionrights.Thelattertwoaresimilarinthesensethattheyaremarket-basedinstrumentsthatusethepricesystemtointernalizeenvironmentaldamages.Theycomparefavorablytothetwoformerapproachesbecausetheyareflexibleandcost-effectiveasformallydemonstrated.Despitetheirsimilarity,mostcountriesrelyontaxesinsteadoftradablepermits.SincetheKyotoProtocol,however,thereisarenewedpoliticalandscientificinterestintradableemissionrights.Withthisriseinpublicinterest,theallegedcomplexityofthesystemandsubsequenttransactioncostsareunremittinglycriticized.Inthisarticle,wewillassessthemeritsofthiscriticism.Taxestypicallycarrybothanincentiveandfinancialeffect.AlthoughthepurposeofPigouviantaxationistobringaboutachangeinactivityandpollutionlevels,environmentaltaxescanbeeasilyconceivedasjustanalternativesourceofrevenueforthegovernment.Assumingalowtreasurypreference,publicsupportmayhavetobewonbyanenvironmentaltaxreformthatbalancesenvironmentaltaxrevenueswithtaxcutselsewhereorprovidestaxincentivesforpollutionreduction.However,thisdoesnotsolvethesystemicinformationproblem.Whenenvironmentaltaxesaresettoolow,suboptimalemissionreductionswillresult.Alternatively,hightaxeswillcauseunwarranteddeadweightlosses.Moreover,ithasbeenrecognizedthatthemereexistenceofanexternalitydoesnotinitselfmeritcorrectivestateaction.Coase(1960)convincinglyarguedthat,undercertaincircumstances,thereductionofspill-overeffectscanbeachievedviaprivatenegotiations.Thisinsighthasledtothedevelopmentofanewpolicyinstrument.Transactioncosts:ThequestfortaxonomyTransactioncostsarenowadaysfrequentlyinvokedtoexplaininstitutional,non-marketphenomena.Manydifferentdefinitionsappearintheliterature,offeringvariousconceptualinsightsthathavenotbeentranslatedyetintostandardcostcategories.Therefore,wefirsttakeanotherlookatthedifferentdefinitionsofferedbyvariousauthorsfromwhichwewillderiveanoperationalandpossiblycompletetaxonomy.TheconceptoftransactioncostswasintroducedbyCoase(1937)toexplainwhyfirmsexistasanalternativefororganizingeconomicactivitybymeansofexchangetransactionsacrossthemarket.Theansweristhatfirmsarisebecausetherearesubstantialcostsinvolvedinusingthemarket.Manydifferentdefinitionsappearintheliterature,offeringvariousconceptualinsightsthathavenotbeentranslatedyetintostandardcostcategories.Coasewasnotveryexplicitaboutwhathemeantbythesetransactioncosts.Sincedifferenttypesofcostsmaybebornebydifferentplayersatdifferentpointsinthepolicyprocess,aproperclassificationoftransactioncostcategoriesisimportan...