合并政策和税收竞争[文献翻译]VIP免费

原文：MergerPolicyandTaxCompetitionInmanysituationsgovernmentshavesector-specifictaxandregulationpoliciesattheirdisposaltoinfluencethemarketoutcomeafteranationaloraninternationalmergerhastakenplace.Wefindthatwhethernationalorinternationalmergersaremorelikelytobeenactedinthepresenceofnationallyoptimaltaxpoliciesdependscruciallyontheownershipstructureoffirms.Whenallfirmsareowneddomesticallyinthepremergersituation,non-cooperativetaxpoliciesaremoreefficientinthenationalmergercaseandsmallersynergyeffectsareneededforthistypeofmergertobeproposedandcleared.Theseresultsarereversedwhenthereisahighdegreeofforeignfirmownershippriortothemerger.Mergershaveplayedaprominentroleoverthepastdecade,andinternationalmergeractivityhasgrownparticularlyfast.Duringtheperiod1981-1998theannualnumberofmergersandacquisitions(M&A)hasincreasedmorethanfivefoldandtheshareofcross-bordermergershasreachedmorethanonequarterofthetotalbytheendofthisperiod.Thisincreaseinmergeractivityhasledtosituationswhereanationaloraninternationalmergerhavebeenindirectcompetitionwitheachother.ArecentexamplehasbeenthebiddingracefortheleadingSpanishelectricityproviderEndesa,wheretheGerman-basedE.ONcompanyinitiallycompetedwiththeSpanish-basedrivalGasNatural.TheSpanishauthoritiesfavoredthenationalmergerandformulatedsevereobstaclestoaninternationaltake-overbyE.ON,whichwasoneofthereasonswhyE.ONeventuallywithdrewitsbid.AdifferentapproachhasbeentakenbytheBritishgovernment,whichhasfullyliberalizeditselectricitymarketintheearly1990s.Inthisprocess,foreignelectricityproviders(amongthemE.ON)tookoveralargepartoftheBritishelectricityindustry.TheBritishgovernmentrespondedtohighprofitsinthisandotherprivatizedindustriesbyimposingaone-time,sector-specific‘windfallprofittax’in1997.Sincethen,arenewedimpositionofthistaxhasbeenrepeatedlydiscussedasacomplementtotheregulationofpricesthroughtheregulationauthorityOfgem(OfficeofGasandElectricityMarkets).Thelastexampleshowsclearlythatnationalgovernmentsdisposeoveradditionalpolicyinstrumentsinanindustrywhereamergeroraforeignacquisitionhastakenplace.Priceregulationinprivatized`networkindustries'isoneimportantwaytoincreasedomesticconsumersurplusattheexpenseofcorporateprofits,whichoftenaccrue,atleastinpart,toforeignshareholders.Sector-specificprofittaxeshaveverysimilareffects,iftheirproceedsareredistributedtoconsumersincompensationforhighergoodsprices.Ontheotherhand,therearealsomanyindustrieswheresubsidiesaregrantedinordertoimprovethecompetitivenessofdomesticproductsinworldmarkets.Onesetofexamplesaredirectsubsidiestospecificsectors,suchasmining,shipbuilding,steelproduction,orairplaneconstruction.Moreover,severalofthesesectorsandseveralothers(e.g.airtransportation)alsoreceiveindirectsubsidiesbypayingreducedratesofexcisetaxes,inparticularmineraloilorelectricitytaxes.Totheextentthatthese`ecotaxes'representPigouviantaxesthatcausefirmstointernalizethetruesocialcostoftheirproducts,suchtaxrebatesalsorepresentsubsidiestotheinvolvedsectorsand,importantly,totheelectricityandenergysectoritself.Inallthesecases,sector-specifictaxorsubsidypoliciescanbeadjustedbynationalpolicymakersinresponsetoachangeinmarketstructurecausedbyamerger.wearguethatthepossibilitytolevyindustry-specifictaxesorsubsidiesinanationallyoptimalwayhasimportantrepercussionsonthepositionthatnationalregulationauthoritiestakevis-µa-visanationaloraninte...