OptimalCapitalStructure:ReflectionsoneconomicandothervaluesByMarcSchauten&JaapSpronk11・IntroductionDespiteavastliteratureonthecapitalstructureofthefirm(seeHarrisandRaviv，1991，GrahamandHarvey，2001，Bravetal.，2005,foroverviews)therestillisabiggapbetweentheoryandpractice(seee.g.Cools，1993,Tempelaar，1991，Boot&Cools，1997).StartingwiththeseminalworkbyModigliani&Miller(1958,1963)，muchattentionhasbeenpaidtotheoptimalityofcapitalstructurefromtheshareholders'pointofview・Overthelastfewdecadesstudieshavebeenproducedontheeffectofotherstakeholders'interestsoncapitalstructure.Well-knownexamplesaretheinterestsofcustomerswhoreceiveproductorserviceguaranteesfromthecompany(seee.g.Grinblatt&Titman ， 2002).Anotherareathathasreceivedconsiderableattentionistherelationbetweenmanagerialincentivesandcapitalstructure(Ibid.).Furthermore ， theissueofcorporatecontrol(seeJensen&Ruback，1983)and，related，theissueofcorporategovernance^(seeShleifer&Vishney，1997)，receivealionspartofthemorerecentacademicattentionforcapitalstructuredecisions.Fromallthesestudies，onethingisclear:Thecapitalstructuredecision(orrather，themanagementofthecapitalstructureovertime)involvesmoreissuesthanthemaximizationofthefirmsmarketvaluealone.Inthispaper ， wegiveanoverviewofthedifferentobjectivesandconsiderationsthathavebeenproposedintheliterature.Wemakeadistinctionbetweentwobroadlydefinedsituations.Thefirstisthetraditionalcaseofthefirmthatstrivesforthemaximizationofthevalueofthesharesforthecurrentshareholders.Wheneverotherconsiderationsthanvaluemaximizationentercapitalstructuredecisions，theseconsiderationshavetobeinstrumentaltothegoalofvaluemaximization.Thesecondcaseconcernsthefirmthatexplicitlychoosesformoreobjectivesthanvaluemaximizationalone.Thismaybebecausetheshareholdersadoptamultiplestakeholdersapproachorbecauseofadifferentownershipstructurethantheusualcorporatestructuredominatingfinanceliterature.Anexampleofthelatteristheco-operation，alegalentitywhichcanbefoundina.o.manyEuropeancountries.F...
