精品文档---下载后可任意编辑制度性腐败的机制许建明The Mechanisms of Institutional CorruptionJianming Xu 制度性腐败的机制 The Mechanisms of Institutional Corruption 摘要:本文认为,寻租理论并不适用于解释腐败问题,这是因为寻租的博弈结构不同于腐败的博弈结构
主流经济学中对腐败问题的讨论是以民主宪政的统治政制为背景的,这时腐败只是代理问题
本文所讨论的制度性腐败是以专政集权的统治政制为背景的,腐败是专权政制的内在产物,对于专权政制及其统治者来说,腐败是必需的
制度性腐败并不只是代理问题,而是制度问题
而且,统治者运用“反腐败〞策略来维护其统治地位和优化自身的效用水平
关键词:腐败,专权政制,统治者,官阶集团〔成员〕JEL 分类代号:D73,D72,D82Abstract Rent seeking is so different from corruption in their game structures that the rent-seeking theory is not suited to explain corruption problem
The discussions on corruption in modern economics are based on the framework of constitutionalism-democracy regime where corruption just is the agency problem
This paper shows that corruption is neccesary for dictorship as an incentive to increase bureaucracy’s loyal