精品文档---下载后可任意编辑制度性腐败的机制许建明The Mechanisms of Institutional CorruptionJianming Xu 制度性腐败的机制 The Mechanisms of Institutional Corruption 摘要:本文认为,寻租理论并不适用于解释腐败问题,这是因为寻租的博弈结构不同于腐败的博弈结构。主流经济学中对腐败问题的讨论是以民主宪政的统治政制为背景的,这时腐败只是代理问题。本文所讨论的制度性腐败是以专政集权的统治政制为背景的,腐败是专权政制的内在产物,对于专权政制及其统治者来说,腐败是必需的。制度性腐败并不只是代理问题,而是制度问题。而且,统治者运用“反腐败〞策略来维护其统治地位和优化自身的效用水平。关键词:腐败,专权政制,统治者,官阶集团〔成员〕JEL 分类代号:D73,D72,D82Abstract Rent seeking is so different from corruption in their game structures that the rent-seeking theory is not suited to explain corruption problem. The discussions on corruption in modern economics are based on the framework of constitutionalism-democracy regime where corruption just is the agency problem. This paper shows that corruption is neccesary for dictorship as an incentive to increase bureaucracy’s loyalty, namely institutional corruption based on the background of dictorship is not the agency problem but the institutional problem, therefor the dictator uses “anti-corruption 〞 to better his utility.Key Words Corruption,Dictorship,Dictator,Bureaucracy(Bureaucrat) JEL Classification D73,D72,D82精品文档---下载后可任意编辑一、引言作为一个命题,腐败与制度一样古老,而且腐败似乎总是制度组织的阴影,因为制度组织的有效运作需以组织内部结构的影响力不均匀分布为前提条件,这样也就出现了权力,而且制度组织的运作总是以权力来贯彻执行,而权力操作的空间存在也为腐败的病毒提供了寄生的场所。对于权力的警惕,同时也即是腐败作为一学术命题进入学术传统自启蒙时代就已存在,孟德斯鸠〔Montesquieu〕在?论法的精神?中说道:“一切有权力的人都容易滥用权力,这是万古不易的一条经验。〞〔上册,页 153〕对于权力与腐败之间如胶似漆的联系,十九世纪的英国历...