锁定期权:可能的滥用及其规制——上市公司定向增发滥用之防范贺绍奇(中国政法大学民商经济法学院,北京 102249)摘要:定向增发是上市公司引进战略投资者一种主要手段
但定向增发认购协议中锁定期权的安排很容易被上市公司控制者滥用来达到抵制敌意收购、排挤异议股东的手段
尤其是我国目前上市公司仍然普遍存在“一股独大”、“内部人控制”等现象的情况下,这种滥用很容易发生
而我国目前法律对这种滥用的规制还非常薄弱,存在诸多缺陷,亟待完善
关键词:定向增发;锁定期权;注意义务作者简介:贺绍奇,法学博士,中国政法大学副教授,讨论方向:公司治理、金融法与公用事业民营化与监管
中文图书分类号:DF438
7 文献标志码:AAbstract: Directed private placement is a major means for listed companies to introduce strategic investors
However, lock up option in the subscribing agreement between the issuer and strategic investors can easily be abused as an ant-takeover or freeze-out means
In particular, most of the Chinese listed companies are controlled by one shareholder or corporate insiders, the abuses can more easily take place
The regulation of the law is very frail and defective, urgently waiting for being